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Whitehall Textiles Group Case Study
Whitehall
Textiles Group was founded in 1960 by Don
Whitehall to produce embroidered golf shirts and
hats for corporate clients. The company thrived
during the late 1960s and early 1970s as a
result of three large corporate clients that
each generated over $500,000 in revenues per
year for the company. These three large clients
were in the energy industry, the food industry,
and the tobacco industry and spent significant
sums of money on advertising and promotional
products. The profits generated from these
three clients alone enabled the company to pay
down its debt and allowed Don to take
substantial distributions.
By the early
1980s, however, these clients had begun to scale
back their spending on promotional products,
leaving a large gap in Whitehall’s revenues. In
1982, Don Whitehall was killed in a boating
accident. His will left the company divided
between ten of his family members. His nephew,
Tharren, who had been with the company over ten
years as the senior vice president of marketing
and finance was his chosen successor as chief
executive officer of the firm. The other nine
family members had no objection to his elevation
to CEO.
As the company
struggled to replace the revenues it had lost
from the three major clients, profitability
declined substantially, prompting the company to
engage in deficit spending to maintain
operations and seek to expand the business. As
no major customers began to emerge, Whitehall
Textiles Group expanded its product line to
include socks, scarves, etc. These products
were typically produced in volume for private
label customers and carried a much lower profit
margin than the golf shirts and hats. This
expansion enabled the company to break-even
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The
company’s debt had increased to over $4 million
as compared to total assets of $5 million and
revenues of $7 million.
However, the
passage of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) prompted many textile
producers to move operations to Mexico where
non-unionized workers were abundant,
productivity was higher, and wages were
substantially lower. This enabled many textile
companies to obtain a competitive advantage over
those producers in the United States who still
sought to compete on the basis of “American
Made” and higher quality. In reality, the
consumers were not willing to pay more for
products made in the USA, particularly if the
quality of the products was not materially
different than those produced in low wage
countries such as Mexico.
Whitehall Textiles Group, the largest employer
in its county, chose to remain in the United
States and employ its relatively stable
workforce. In an effort to remain competitive,
Whitehall Textiles Group cut prices to match
those of produces from low wage countries and
increased production volume, in an attempt to
compensate for further compressed profit margins
by selling greater quantities. Realizing that
the company needed guidance beyond the level of
which he was capable, Tharren hired Jake Black,
a former textile executive at a $50 million firm
who had lost his job when he opposed moving the
company’s operations to Mexico. Tharren,
resigned to overseeing the company as the
chairman of the board, ceded operational control
and the role of CEO to Jake who embarked on an
ambitious program of wooing clients from his
former employer. Jake also convinced the board
to borrow an additional $1 million to invest in
refurbished equipment necessary to increase the
output of the factory and increase the
efficiency of production.
The
company was again operating at a deficit, given
the increased costs of servicing the firm’s
growing debt burden. By the end of 2005,
Whitehall Textiles Group’s debt had increased to
$9 million as compared to assets of only $6
million. Revenues were $10 million. Net cash
flow to invested capital was $500,000. With the
company floundering under its own weight, Jake
pursued a lead on a new textile material that
was expected to revolutionize the industry, much
as spandex had done during the 1970s. Jake put
a great deal of faith in this product and began
producing products using the new material for
their manufacturing. This produced further
losses as the material failed to catch on in the
market.
Frustrated and sensing pending doom, Tharren
engaged a valuation analyst to conduct a
valuation of the firm for contemplation of a
potential sale or liquidation. In conducting
the valuation, the analyst concluded the
following:
·
Whitehall Textiles Group had experienced
sizeable losses, resulting in a $3 million
equity loss on the most recent fiscal year end
balance sheet. The analyst, however, was not
totally surprised by this as many closely held
and family controlled companies had negative
book values as a result of managing earnings for
tax purposes, etc.
·
Competition in the textile industry had
intensified following passage of NAFTA and the
movement of textile jobs to low wage countries.
For companies that chose to remain in the United
States, there had been significant downward
pressure on prices and profit margins.
·
Productivity at Whitehall Textiles Group was
significantly lower than that of the industry as
a whole.
·
Net cash flow to invested capital, on an
adjusted basis, at $500,000 was sub-par as
compared to the industry, when looked at as a
percentage of revenues.
·
Net cash flow to equity (adjusted) was virtually
$0. Any deficit spending was financed using
additional debt in the form of notes to Tharren
and other shareholders.
·
Growth expectations for revenues and net cash
flow to invested capital were 4% annually, in
line with that of the industry as a whole.
·
Given the financial position, Whitehall Textiles
Group would not likely be able to meet the
balloon payments on its debt and lease
agreements, which totaled over $2.5 million, due
in July of the coming fiscal year.
·
The average interest rate on the long-term debt
was 10%.
·
A
search of several transaction databases
indicated that the average price to sales
multiple of companies in the textile industry
that had been acquired was 1.25 with a median of
1.15 and a standard deviation of 0.25.
·
The marginal tax rate is 20%.
Given the
relative stability of the company’s net cash
flow and revenues over the last ten years, the
valuation analyst believes that the single
period capitalization method and the direct
market data method are appropriate for use in
developing an indication of value. Using a
build-up method, the valuation analyst computes
the company’s cost of equity capital at 32%. In
this calculation, the valuation analyst applied
a 10% specific company risk premium using a
factor analysis developed by Highland Global,
LLC. Based on this, the company’s average
interest on its debt of 10% and net cash flow to
invested capital of $500,000, the valuation
analyst determines that the weighted average
cost of capital is roughly 9.3%. With a 4%
long-term sustainable growth rate, the
capitalization rate is 5.3% or a capitalization
multiple of 19.0. This produces an indication
of value for the firm of roughly $9.5 million on
an enterprise basis. Removing the long-term
debt produces an indication of value of the
company’s equity of $500,000. Applying a lack
of marketability discount of 30% based on an
analysis of various factors, the fair market
value estimate of the firm’s equity is $350,000.
Under the direct
market data method, the valuation analyst elects
to apply a price to sales multiple of 0.95,
below both the average and the median. This
lower multiple is based on the specific risk
characteristics of the firm. Adjusting for
differences in working capital, the value
estimate arrived under the direct market data
method is $9.565 million on an enterprise
basis. Removing the long-term debt from the
value conclusion produces an indication of the
equity value of $565,000. No discounts for lack
of control or marketability are deemed
necessary.
Weighting the
two methods equally, the valuation analyst
arrives at a fair market value of the firm’s
equity of $458,000.
When
assessing the prospects that the firm may have a
higher value to the shareholders if liquidated,
the valuation analyst decides that the value of
the firm is higher as a going concern given that
the firm’s fixed assets with a market value of
$3.5 million (based on an appraisal of the
equipment conducted by a qualified appraiser)
would likely not secure a high enough price in
an orderly liquidation to satisfy the firm’s $9
million in total debt.
However, the valuation analyst is not fully
convinced by the value conclusion arrived
through his analysis. Particularly disturbing
is the abnormally low weighted average cost of
capital for Whitehall Textiles Group of 9.3% as
compared to an industry wide weighted average
cost of capital of 14.0%. The analyst concludes
that this is due to the substantial leverage
used in the capital structure of the company,
which helps to reduce the weighted average cost
of capital and, thus, increase the value of the
firm. If the firm were well managed,
experienced stable profitability as measured by
net income, had a positive net book value, and
maintained ample interest coverage, this high
proportion of debt in the capital structure
would be a skillful technique to increase return
on equity and maximize return for the
shareholders.
In this case,
Whitehall Textiles Group is obviously facing
financial distress which would tend to increase
the risk profile of the firm and reduce the
overall value. Though the cost of equity
capital was increased through the specific
company risk premium to account for the risk
factors of the company, the debt levels
minimized this impact when calculating the
weighted average cost of capital. In
retrospect, the valuation analyst realized that
some adjustment must be made to the firm’s cost
of capital to reflect the financial distress of
the firm or allow this perverse relationship
between the company’s debt levels and weighted
average cost of capital to skew the value
estimate of the firm.
To
correct this situation, the valuation analyst
must increase the weighted average cost of
capital for the firm used in calculating the
value estimate under the single period
capitalization method. Increasing the cost of
equity capital would be an intuitively logical
way of raising the weighted average cost of
capital. In this case, however, the cost of
equity capital contributes very little to the
overall weighted average cost of capital (less
than a 6% weighting); therefore, increasing the
cost of equity capital even to 100% would have
virtually no impact upon the weighted average
cost of capital.
In light of
this, the valuation analyst decides to use the
industry weighted average cost of capital of 14%
for valuation purposes of Whitehall Textiles
Group. Based on a 14% weighted average cost of
capital and a 4% growth rate, the capitalization
rate is 10% with a capitalization multiple of
10.0. Using the same $500,000 net cash flow to
invested capital, this produces a value
indication on an enterprise basis of $5
million. Removing the long-term debt, the
analyst arrives at an implied equity value of
-$4 million. The analyst believes that this
makes more sense given the pending financial
distress of the company, its lower productivity,
and its relative uncompetitive position in the
market.
With
respect to the direct market data method, the
valuation analyst does believe that another
textile company would have any interest in
acquiring Whitehall Textiles Group given its
financial distress, older fixed asset base, and
its inability to compete effectively and
efficiently.
Based on this, the valuation analyst confronts
the quandary that this is a company that does
not have any value left in it. It is obvious
that the company is currently insolvent and
could reasonably file for bankruptcy protection
while it reorganizes. Even in a liquidation,
some of the creditors would likely stand to lose
a great deal of money. Even if an orderly
liquidation enabled the company to obtain a
market value of $6 million for all of its assets
(the current book value), there would still be a
$3 million shortfall in its ability to pay its
total debt. This is a unique situation for a
valuation analyst, but one that may occur when a
company faces almost certain financial distress
and is engaged in an industry that is not
financial viable or attractive any longer.
As a
post script, the valuation analyst presented the
findings to Tharren. In an effort to help, the
valuation analyst separately recommended ways to
begin improving the financial health of the
firm, including improving productivity, reducing
unprofitable product lines, etc. Tharren
received the valuation analyst’s findings warmly
and attempted to implement measures to save the
Whitehall Textiles Group. After firing Jake
Black and resuming control of the company,
Tharren began cutting costs and making efforts
to improve productivity. Though his efforts
were a welcome change, they proved to be too
little too late. In July of that year, less
than six months later, Whitehall Textiles Group
closed its doors, filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy, and began liquidating the firm.
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